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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
relationship between degree of familiarity with a person 
and ability to make accurate judgments of that person's 
behavior. A secondary purpose is to explore two related 
techniques for measuring judgment accuracy in order to 
determine the extent of comparability and, thus, gener­
ality between them. Following is a review of the liter­
ature dealing with the relationships between familiarity 
and several aspects of interpersonal prediction.
One aspect of the study of cognitive-perceptual 
functioning examines the process of how one comes to know 
and to understand other persons, their characteristics, 
qualities, and inner states. In most systematic approaches 
to this process, judging accuracy is included as a central 
concept (Asch, 19^6; Bruner & Tagiuri, 195^; Cline, 1964; 
Murray, 1933; Sarbin, Taft, & Bailey, I96O; Secord &
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Backman, 1964; Tagiuri & Petrullo, 1958). Each of these 
writers recognizes the relevance of accurate social per­
ception for effective interpersonal behavior. For example, 
Cline states:
In a great variety of formal occupations, 
positions of leadership, and marital, parental, 
and psychotherapeutic relationships, as well as 
in informal social units, effective functioning 
would appear to be critically related to and 
dependent upon our ability to perceive subtleties 
and nuances in the behavior of others (1964,
p. 222).
Despite the accepted importance of the concept, 
disagreement and confusion about the meaning of judgment 
accuracy exist (Cronbach, 1955, 1958; Cronbach & Gleser, 
1953; Crow, I96O; Gage & Cronbach, 1955; Gage, Leavitt,
& Stone, 1956; Hastorf & Bender, 1952; Hastorf, Bender,
& Weintraub, 1955; Tagiuri & Petrullo, 1958). Tagiuri 
and Petrullo (I958), for instance, view studies of the 
Accuracy concept as yielding data that are inconsistent, 
difficult to interpret, and impossible to compare. In 
extending this position Tagiuri states:
For a number of reasons, attempts at study­
ing correlates of accuracy have with very few 
exceptions produced negligible correlations and 
yielded very little insight into processes.
First there is no single satisfactory criterion 
against which to match the judgments. The cri­
teria used--objective behavior, self ratings by 
the object persons, ratings by the experts, con­
sensual ratings by peers--do not always agree 
and have very different psychological impli­
cations. Second, the disparity of tasks and 
abilities subsumed under the various operations
called measures of accuracy have been glossed 
over. . . .  There is furthermore the extreme 
dependence of results upon judgmental sets and 
upon the distributions of the variables that 
are to be judged. . . .  It is the process 
rather than its achievement that one must in­
vestigate if a broad understanding of the phe­
nomenon is to be reached (Tagiuri & Petrullo,
1958, p. 324).
Crow (i960) challenges the implications of Tagiuri's 
position by recommending a cautious examination of any 
approach to interpersonal perception which ignores the 
accuracy issue. Rather, Crow considers both the degree of 
and the conditions leading to accuracy as aspects deserving 
of legitimate research.
The current interpersonal perception literature 
continues to reveal a sharp cleavage between research which 
emphasizes accuracy of judgment and that which focuses on 
process (i.e., how one judges). In specific instances, the 
accuracy versus process approaches blend, and of course 
there are research contributions that fit poorly into this 
simple dichotomy (Heider, 1958; Izard, 1960a, 1960b; Jackson 
& Messick, I963; Leventhal, 1957; Levy, I961, I963). The 
bifurcation remains, however, a convenient categorical 
scheme from which to survey the work completed.
Definition of Judging Accuracy 
In line with current usage, the term "judging 
accuracy" is defined as the discrepancy between a prediction
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and a criterion, e.g., the self-ratings by a subject and the 
ratings attributed to him by a judge. More specifically, 
judges, after observation of some other individual or group 
(objects), are asked to estimate or predict some character- 
istic(s) of the objects for which some operational measure 
is available. Then the estimates or predictions are com­
pared to some criterion measure of the actual character­
istics of the objects, and a measure of the agreement between 
the two is taken as an index of the judge's accuracy.
Numerous variations of the operational definition 
of accuracy have been employed in a substantial number of 
investigations (Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954; Dymond, 1954; Dymond 
& Cottrell, 1949; Secord, 1958; Shrauger 8c Altrocchi, 1964; 
Taft, 1955, 1966). However, the general experimental para­
digm usually includes three components: (a) responses which
the judge himself gives to the judging instrument, (b) re­
sponses the other person being predicted gives to the judg­
ing instrument, and (c) predictions made by the judge about 
the other's responses to the judging instrument. By summing 
the correct number of predictions made by each judge on the 
other person, a measure of judging accuracy is obtained.
Not all researchers agree that judging accuracy is 
a pure measure of the ability under investigation (Cronbach, 
1955, 1958; Gage & Cronbach, 1955). Cronbach (1955), using 
the D statistic (i.e., the squared arithmetical difference
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between judgment and criterion ratings, summed over all 
items), has shown that accuracy scores can be partitioned 
into a number of possible sources of variance. Although 
the breakdown of the variance can be quite complex, three 
main sources are pertinent to the present study.
1. Accuracy due to assumed similarity refers to the 
degree to which the judge describes the other person as 
being similar to himself. When the responses of the judge 
and the object person are actually similar, accuracy will be 
a direct function of assumed similarity (Chowdhry & Newcomb, 
1952; Nagel, 1954). Taft (I966) suggests two ways assumed 
similarity could have a differential effect on the accuracy 
of predictions of acquaintances and strangers: (a) The judge 
may assume more similarity in one case than in the other. 
Experimental verification of this notion is offered by 
Sarbin, Taft, and Bailey (1960). They cite several studies 
which suggest that assumed similarity in judging persons 
whom one likes leads to greater accuracy in the judgments, 
(b) Acquaintances, rather than strangers, tend to be more 
similar to the judge; thus, due to assumed similarity, 
judgments of the acquaintances would be accidentally the 
more accurate.
2. Stereotype accuracy corresponds to a measure of 
how accurately each judge predicts the traits of the 
"typical" stimulus person. If the judge has an accurate
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conception of how people of the object person's type usually 
behave in the situation in question, stereotype accuracy may 
occur. The categorical image may be very broad, such as "an 
adult human," or it may be as specific as "an introverted, 
Oklahoma, male student, age 21." It is expected that stere­
otype accuracy generally applies to judgments of strangers 
about whom only minimal information is known (Richards, 
Cline, & Rardin, I962). In contrast, judgments of acquain­
tances have the additional advantage of the judge's accumu­
lation of information about the behavior which characterizes 
the object person. Provided that the judge is capable of 
utilizing the additional information, it is expected that 
with increasing familiarity with the object person, the 
more accurate the judgments-
Sarbin et al. (196O) believe that all social per­
ception judgments are based on stereotypes; that is, the 
judge categorizes the object person into relevant dimensions 
with known characteristics by a process of simultaneous and 
successive "taxonomic sortings." If the dimensions are 
simple, readily observable, or broad, one refers to the 
"stereotype accuracy" of the judgments; when they are 
complex, covert, or narrow, one is more likely to speak of 
the "differential accuracy."
3. The final source of variance in accuracy scores 
is the ability to predict differences between object persons
7
on an item or category in question (i.e., differential 
accuracy). It could produce a greater degree of accuracy in 
judging close acquaintances if the judge is able to combine 
the additional dimensions in a veridical manner.
In summary, each source of accuracy would seem to 
favor judgments of close acquaintances, and possibly casual 
acquaintances, over those of nonacquaintances.
Additional Sources of Error in Accuracy Scores
An even more detailed examination of the kinds of 
biases and response sets which can add error variance as 
well as "chance success" to accuracy scores is presented 
below, as originally delineated by Cline (196(1).
Social desirability bias is the tendency for judges 
to predict the most socially desirable response when judging 
others (Edwards, 1959a). Cline and Richards (1964) reported 
that when making value judgments, judges differed more in 
choosing socially desirable answers than in predicting the 
accurate response. Special scoring keys were constructed to 
make it possible to analyze separately all possible combi­
nations of correct response and socially desirable response. 
The finding indicates quite clearly that variation in se­
lecting the socially desirable response may be more important 
than variation in accuracy in certain judging tasks.
Acquiescence is a response set whereby the judge 
tends to agree with or predict "yes" to items rather than to
8
choose the negative or "no” responses.
Making use of an ”implicit personality theory” 
(Cronbach, 1955) is the tendency for judges to assume an in­
variant relationship between trait A (observed in the other) 
and traits B, C, and D (not observed but assumed correlated). 
Koltuv (1962) demonstrated the effect of perceived con­
sistency in trait intercorrelations on judgments of people. 
She obtained personally relevant and nonrelevant traits 
together with the names of familiar and unfamiliar people 
for each of her subjects who then rated these people on both 
kinds of traits. The findings indicated that judges im­
plicitly assumed a matrix of correlations existed among 
traits. These correlations were greater for unfamiliar than 
familiar persons, were greater among personally relevant 
than among nonrelevant traits, and were not wholly a function 
of the overall evaluative attitude of the subject or the 
logical connections between certain traits. In another sit­
uation unlike Koltuv's (1962), Secord and Berscheid (1963) 
studied the generality of trait intercorrelations, showing 
that certain types of traits are perceived as highly inter­
correlated not only in judgments of people in whom these 
traits are commonly thought to appear together, but also in 
other people as well. However, Koltuv (1962) and Secord 
(1958) suggest that it is unrealistic to assume that people 
apply their implicit theories of personality indiscriminately
9
in the judgment of all people.
The tendency to make extreme judgments involves a 
response set whereby the judge gives a characteristic spread 
to his predictions, thus overdifferentiating in his ratings 
of others. As an example, one judge may show a large amount 
of variation in his ratings and another judge may confine 
all his judgments to a middle range. If both judges are 
equally skilled at social perception but distribute their 
ratings with unequal variability, the one who varies them 
less is likely to achieve the higher accuracy score (Brown,
1965).
A related phenomenon is the central tendency re­
sponse set, whereby the judge sees most object persons as 
being very similar or alike and gives them mostly average 
scores with very little differentiation from other to other.
If the judge is in the position of making judgments based on 
minimal information, he would be wise to restrict the varia­
bility of his judgments, giving people closely similar values.
A final source of error in accuracy scores is the 
occurrence of semantic ambiguities in trait terms. This may 
result if the judge interprets the trait term in the predict­
ing instrument to mean other than that intended in its cri­
terion development and use.
While it remains impossible to design a study that 
takes into account all the sources of error variance that
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have been identified, a few investigators have sought for 
new approaches to the accuracy problem with more appropriate 
methodologies (Bronfenbrenner, Harding, & Gallwey, 1958; 
Sechrest & Jackson, I961). For example, measures of differ­
ential and stereotype accuracy have been methodologically 
and conceptually isolated as two independent factors (Bron- 
fenbrenner et al., 1958). Furthermore, it has been shown 
that the ability to judge others cannot be adequately de­
scribed by a single score (Cline, 19&4; Sechrest & Jackson,
1961). Such specific investigations have emerged only 
recently. In sum, until a fully satisfactory measure of 
judging ability is found, the relation of accuracy to social 
perception variables eludes sharp focus.
Relation of Familiarity to Judgment Accuracy 
Despite considerable research exploring the factors 
which influence judging ability, only a few studies haye 
examined the association between familiarity and the accuracy 
of social judgments (Ferguson, 1949; Knight, 1923; Newcomb, 
1958; Richey, 1953; Shen, 1925; Taft, I966). The central 
theoretical question preyalent throughout most of these 
studies is whether one can make more accurate predictions of 
persons whom one knows well than of persons whom one barely 
knows. Taft (1955) entertains the possibility that knowing 
a person intimately may lead to so much information about .
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him that judgments may give too much weight to some data and 
far too little to other, more relevant, data. Another po­
tential handicap in judging close acquaintances, as mentioned 
in the preceding section, is a set towards favorable judg­
ments. Sarbin et al. (196O) consider the set to judge favor­
ably as leading to complicated interactions between accuracy, 
degree of personal involvement, familiarity, and the attract­
iveness of the other person's personality. Moreover, such 
interactions could conceivably reduce the contribution which 
familiarity might make to the accuracy of various behavioral 
judgments. In brief, despite the available information a 
judge has when he evaluates another person, beyond a critical 
point additional knowledge may interfere with the optimal use 
of existing information. Only a limited number of studies 
bear evidence pertaining to this questionable possibility.
Knight (1923) examined the effect of varying lengths 
of acquaintanceship upon accuracy and reliability of personal 
ratings. Data obtained in this study were analyzed ratings 
of 1,048 public school teachers of one school system made by 
a supervisor under whom the teachers were working. He di­
vided his subjects into four criterion groups to delimit 
acquaintanceship: Those rated who were known to the super­
visor (a) less than 1 year, (b) an average of 1.3 years, (c) 
an average of 7 years, and (d) more than 8 years. The factor 
of acquaintanceship operated to make the ratings more
12
lenient, less critical, and less analytical. The author 
concludes "It is in the direction of truth to discount the 
ratings of judges when acquaintance has been long" (Knight, 
1923, p. l42). Contrary to the findings of Knight, Shen 
(1925) found that friendship does not affect the accuracy of 
ratings in any consistent manner. He considered acquaint­
anceship as affording an opportunity for close observation, 
but at the same time as giving one a bias.
Richey (1953) compared the ability of institutional 
adolescents with that of community adolescents to predict 
responses of their respective peer group acquaintances. A 
questionnaire composed of items from the social and emotional 
scales of the Bell Adjustment Inventory was used to measure 
accuracy. Community subjects were found to judge members of 
their own group more correctly than institutional subjects 
who judged their own group. The finding was interpreted to 
mean that accuracy of social judgments depends upon factors 
promoting social-emotional adjustment. Both of the groups 
assumed similarity to their own members, and community sub­
jects significantly more so. In retrospect, all of the re­
sults appear somewhat speculative, especially since the pre­
dictive accuracy and adjustment variables were measured by 
the same scale.
Another investigator has offered more conclusive 
data on the relationship between familiarity and accuracy of
13
personality judgments (Ferguson, 1949). He found that rat­
ings made of assistant managers by traveling field repre­
sentatives in an insurance company became more accurate as 
the acquaintanceship of the raters with the managers in­
creased. Caution should be exercised in generalizing from 
this study, since its criterion of accuracy seems uncertain 
as well as quite limited in its scope.
As part of a larger study of changing interrelation­
ships over time between interpersonal attraction and similar­
ity of attitudes (both actual and estimated), Newcomb (1958) 
attempted to determine whether accuracy of estimates will 
increase with time, particularly at higher levels of attrac­
tion. The subjects of this study were 17 male students who 
transferred to The University of Michigan, totally unfamiliar 
with each other prior to moving into a small university resi­
dence. Following two weeks of acquaintanceship and again 
three and one-half months later, each subject rank-ordered 
the six values of the Allport-Vernon Scale of Values: Once 
according to their relative importance to himself, and again 
as to their relative importance to each of the other l6 men. 
Newcomb reported a substantial increase in the veridicality 
of estimates between the two testing sessions. He inter­
preted this to mean that upon first acquaintance, persons 
are "scanned" for clues as to their values and attitudes. 
However, given ample opportunity for association and
14
communication, judgments tend to become more accurate, espe­
cially among highly attracted persons.
Corsini and Oakes (1961) investigated the accuracy 
of predicted Q sorts, using a college instructor as a 
standard stimulus person for all subjects. Subjects were 
instructed first to sort the 50 adjectives for self and then 
to try to duplicate the stimulus person's self-sort. All 
subjects were exposed to the instructor from 21 to 78 contact 
hours in a classroom setting. The results disclosed that 
fairly accurate Q sorts of another's social self are attain­
able after only 20 to 30 hours of exposure to that other.
Of particular interest is that after observing an instructor 
in a classroom for hours, subjects were able to form an 
average accuracy of perception comparable to the average 
perceptiveness of a mate's spouse attained through 6 years 
of marriage. In support of this finding, 3^ per cent of 
the 68 subjects exceeded the mean accuracy score for a group 
of married couples who were subjected to the same procedures.
Indirect but supportive evidence exists in the find­
ings of other investigators that how accurately one is per­
ceived depends with some regularity upon the interpersonal 
relationship between himself and the judge (Bieri, 1953; 
Corsini, 1956a, 1956b; Couch, 1958; Dymond, 195^; Fiedler, 




Corsini (1956b) has provided important results on 
the relation of accuracy of perception and happiness among 
marital partners. Twenty volunteer students and their 
spouses from The University of Chicago participated. Marital 
happiness was assessed by the Burgess-Wallin scale (1939).
A 50-item adjective Q sort was sorted four times by each 
subject: (a) for self, (b) for spouse, (c) for predicting
the spouse's responses, and, adding a new dimension to pre­
vious research, (d) for predicting the spouse's description 
of the subject. A long overdue experimental control was in­
stituted by Corsini: Every conclusion with respect to couples 
was checked by drawing random samples of noncouples, and the 
same procedures for couples duplicated. Understanding the 
mate was not related to similarity of self and mate, although 
happiness was associated with similarity of self-perceptions.
Dymond (1954) has furnished further data on the 
accuracy of interpersonal perceptions among married couples. 
Her subjects were 15 couples well known to her, with a mean 
length of marriage of 10.4 years. One hundred MMPI items, 
pertaining to interaction with others, were administered to 
each of the 30 subjects. After answering for self, each 
subject predicted the spouse's answers. In order to control 
for stereotypy of reply, all items which were answered 
uniformly by more than two-thirds of the group were
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eliminated, leaving 55 items exhibiting a reasonable degree 
of difference. Since the yes-no probabilities of these items 
were roughly equal, predictive ability ("understanding”) 
would be uncontaminated by knowledge of group norms. Scores 
were then related to the happiness of the marriage, as rated 
by the subjects themselves and validated by Dymond's rating.
The expected finding occurred: Happily married spouses re­
sembled each other more than unhappily "marrieds." Dymond's __—  
principal hypothesis was also verified, namely that "happys" 
predict spouse replies significantly better than do "un- 
happys." Further, there was significantly less association 
between similarity of self-spouse and accuracy of prediction 
in the happy group than in the unhappy group.
Couch (1958) found consensus on husband and wife 
roles increased with length of marriage, as did accuracy in 
assuming the role of the other mate. The study, however, 
was cross-sectional rather than longitudinal. Couch offered 
it principally for its methodological and conceptual interests.
In a dissertation, Lundy (196O) tested the hypothe­
sis that perceptual change will be in the direction of in­
creased accuracy of prediction when the predictor focuses his 
attention upon another person as opposed to himself. Subjects 
completed the Allport-Vernon Scale of Values. Two to three 
weeks later each subject met with two other subjects to dis­
cuss a topic for five minutes with each of them. Before and
17
after each discussion subjects filled in the scale as they 
thought their partners had completed it. Before one of the 
discussions the subject was instructed to focus his atten­
tion upon himself ; before the other discussion he was asked 
to focus his attention i^on his partner. The hypothesis 
received overwhelming support.
Bieri (1953) dealt with the question of what happens 
to one's perception of another person as a result of inter­
acting with that person. He hypothesized that an individual 
will tend to see another person as more similar to himself 
after a period of constructive interaction than before the 
interaction has occurred. He divided his subjects into 
pairs and had each pair participate in one of two experi­
mental conditions. The experimental conditions differed 
only with respect to a social interaction set created by the 
experimenter. The set was induced in one group by having 
pairs of subjects discuss several aspects of psychology 
courses both were taking and a hypothetical vacation which 
the two subjects were to spend together. The experimental 
procedure consisted of (a) completing the Rosenzweig Picture 
Frustration Test for self and first prediction for partner, 
(b) holding two 10 minute interaction situations, and (c) 
requesting a second prediction for partner. Subjects in a 
control condition participated in (a) and (c), but did not 
engage in discussion sessions.
18
A significant increase was found in similarity to 
self between the first and second predictions for the experi­
mental group, with no change discovered in the control group.
The relationship between perceived similarity and 
attraction for another person has been studied by Fiedler et 
al. (1952). Subjects in this study, 26 fraternity members, 
were asked to describe themselves and then to predict the 
self-descriptions of their most-preferred and least-preferred 
fraternity brothers. Perceived similarity of the most-pre­
ferred person was significantly greater than the perceived 
similarity of the least-preferred person. On the other hand, 
there was no consistent relationship between actual similar­
ity of fraternity members and their sociometric choices.
In one of the most well-designed investigations, 
Richards et al. (I962) evaluated the effect of varied stimu­
lus information on judging accuracy scores. Using a Belief- 
Values Inventory and a standard set of six filmed interviews, 
95 judges (the full information group) made their judgments 
on the basis of seeing and hearing the filmed interviews.
A second group consisted~~bf 50 persons who filled out the 
inventory without seeing the films at all, only knowing the 
age, sex, marital status, and number of children of the six 
stimulus persons. The third group included 58 judges who 
filled out the same inventory only twice, once as they 
thought it would apply to a typical American adult male and
19
once for a typical American adult female. Thus, in these 
last two groups the judges were required to make predictions 
solely on the basis of stereotypes, though the amount of 
information varied.
Results for the accuracy score revealed that judges 
in the full information group were significantly superior 
both at rank ordering the stimulus person in terms of con­
ventional religious values and at predicting exactly the re­
sponses of these same stimulus persons. Of particular inter­
est to the current discussion is that differential accuracy 
among stimulus persons increased as the amount of information 
provided about them increased.
In view of the research summarized""above, it is 
possible to draw some basic generalizations.
1. Acquaintanceship combined with information on 
another person serves to increase the accuracy of predictions 
on a variety of judging scales.
2. The advantage of extra information obtained 
through familiarity is not counteracted by a bias that might 
arise from the affective relationship between the judge and 
object person.
3. Judgments of a relative stranger are attributable 
to stereotyping plus additional overt information such as 
sex, age, and expressive behavior.
4. It is apparent that for none of the above
20
generalizations is there complete agreement among investi­
gators. Lack of agreement may be attributable to differences 
with respect to judging tasks, sources of criterion data, 
measures of apcuraty scores, and nature of the behavior 
judged.
Taft's Research 
Taft (1966) presented the most elaborate research 
study dealing with the relationship between familiarity and 
accuracy of judgmental predictions. In a manner similar to 
that of other researchers, he assumed that familiarity aids 
in the accuracy of judgments. Since his experiment has 
stimulated both the conceptual and methodological reasoning 
for the present study, it is necessary to consider it in 
detail.
Initially, Taft hypothesized that personality judg­
ments of acquaintances are more accurate than those of non­
acquaintances. An additional purpose of the study was to 
identify the sources of accuracy in judging both types of 
object persons. Q sorts of personality traits were used to 
assess the accuracy of judgments. The underlying rationale 
for selecting this technique is that it holds constant the 
mean and variance of the judgments, thus controlling for the 
amount of spread or dispersion.
Members of a psychology class were instructed to
21
sort a list of 58 self-descriptive adjectives into seven 
categories from "least like self" to "most like self." Next, 
each subject was asked to predict how two of his fellow 
students would sort the adjectives when rating themselves.
One of the object persons was a member of the class whom the 
subject "knew best" and the other was one whom the subject 
"knew least" or virtually not at all. The criterion of accu­
racy, the object person's self Q sort, was correlated with 
the subject's prediction in order to obtain an index of 
predictive accuracy.
During a preliminary phase of the study, Taft found 
that judgments of acquaintances yielded a significantly 
higher accuracy score than judgments of strangers. The mean 
correlation was .43 for the former group compared with .31 
for the latter group.
In the main experiment, Taft instituted an addi­
tional control for knowledge of the task's nature on the 
choice and rating of the two object persons. A class of 62 
students was divided into two unequal groups. One group of 
23 subjects selected their two object persons and indicated 
how well they knew them on a scale developed to reflect ex­
tent of familiarity after they learned the nature of the 
experiment. Another group of 39 subjects selected the fellow 
student they "knew best" and the one they "knew least" prior 
to being informed of the purpose of the experiment. Since
22
there were no differences between the groups on the measures 
of accuracy, the final results were pooled. The principal 
findings are summarized below:
1. Although the mean accuracy score for the judg,-
ments of acquaintances was significantly greater than that
for the judgments of strangers, the latter score was more 
accurate than chance. In fact, 35 per cent of the subjects 
predicted strangers more accurately than acquaintances.
2. The degree of actual similarity between the judge 
and the object person was significantly correlated with total 
accuracy.
3. The amount of assumed similarity was greater in 
the judgments of acquaintances than in those of strangers. 
However, assumed similarity was not an advantage in attaining 
accuracy, since the actual similarity between the judge and 
his acquaintance did not differ from that between the judge 
and his nonacquaintance.
4. Assumed similarity did not correlate signifi­
cantly with the total accuracy score.
5. A significant difference between the number of
"know best" and "know least" persons of the same sex was 
found, although this did not affect the accuracy of the judg­
ments since there was no relationship between sex similarity 
and accuracy.
6 . Sex of the object person made no difference in
23
the degree of assumed similarity made by the judge. There 
was significantly more actual similarity between the judges 
and object persons when they were opposite in sex than when 
they were the same, especially when the object person was a 
stranger.
In all, Taft's results force the conclusion that 
greater accuracy of judgments of acquaintances cannot be 
attributed to an interaction between actual similarity and 
assumed similarity.
The present author has replicated only that part 
of Taft's study concerned with accuracy of personality judg­
ments of acquaintances and nonacquaintances (Hjelle, I966). 
In addition to a Q-sort, a free-sort procedure was included 
to determine whether subjects distribute self-descriptive 
adjectives in a way similar to that required by the forced- 
sort procedure. In brief, the Q-sort findings in regard to 
degree of accuracy achieved closely resembled those reported 
by Taft, although they failed to reach statistical signifi­
cance. In contrast, an examination of the distributions 
obtained from the free sort indicated consistent differences 
between the observed number of items in each of seven cate­
gories and the expected number. Whether such differences 
affect the degree of accuracy achieved in predicting 
another's self sort remains to be determined. If accuracy 
scores obtained from the use of Q-sort and free-sort
2k
techniques are in fundamental agreement, then both tasks may 
be used interchangeably in assessing the relationship between 
familiarity and judging accuracy. The need also seems 
apparent for greater specification of the association between 




The present study is focused on the relationship 
between degree of familiarity with a person and ability to 
make accurate behavioral judgments of that person's behavior, 
This study emerged indirectly from ah investigation on accu­
racy of empathie judgments of acquaintances and strangers 
(Taft, 1966) and represents an attempt to provide more 
control over the criterion for familiarity, the nature of 
predictions made, and the kind of person predicted than was 
considered in that study. A second purpose of the present 
study is to examine the accuracy of personality judgments 
using two related judging tasks (i.e., Q sort and free sort) 
in order to determine the extent to which generality between 
these techniques exists.
Since the familiarity and accuracy of judgment 
variables may be characterized in different ways, it seems 
advisable to indicate the ways in which they are used in 
this study. "Familiarity" refers to both the length and 
type of social relationship existing between two people,
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extending from a highly intimate relationship (marriage), 
to a casual relationship (familiar as fellow student), to a 
nonacquaintance relationship (stranger). "Judgment accuracy" 
refers to the ability to make correct predictions of another 
person's behavior on a set of items depicting various social 
situations and personality traits.
Following from a general statement of the problem . 
in the preceding section, the two specific hypotheses to be 
tested are as follows:
Hypothesis _1. Social and personality judgments of 
an intimate acquaintance are more accurate than those of 
either a casual acquaintance or a nonacquaintance, whereas 
the same judgments of a casual acquaintance are more accu­
rate than those of a nonacquaintance. In other words, 
familiarity with the other person is a direct aid to accu­
racy of judgments. The rationale underlying this hypothe­
sis stems from the observation that with an increase of 
information regarding another person's behavior there is a 
concomittant increase in the veridicality of judgments of 
that person's behavior.
Hypothesis The degree of assumed similarity,
as reflected by the social and personality judgments, of 
intimate acquaintances is greater than that between either 
casual acquaintances or nonacquaintances, whereas the degree 
of assumed similarity of casual acquaintances is greater
27
than that between nonacquaintances. The rationale for this 
hypothesis derives from published evidence that the affective 
and role relations between intimate or casual acquaintances 
serve to increase their respective degree of assumed simi­




Subject selection. The design of the study necessi­
tated the selection of male-female dyads who were either 
intimately acquainted, casually acquainted, or nonacquainted 
with each other. Accordingly, three groups were formed by 
two different sample selection procedures.
Group 1 consisted of volunteer married couples who 
were recruited from a University of Oklahoma housing complex. 
All couples were contacted individually by the experimenter 
who introduced himself as a graduate student in the Depart­
ment of Psychology. He presented a memo from the Office of 
Deans of Students which stated that he was authorized to 
solicit married couples for a social psychology study associ­
ated with a dissertation project. It encouraged partici­
pation but emphasized the voluntary nature of the experiment. 
If the couple agreed to participate, they were assigned an 
appointment time without knowing the purpose of the experi­
ment. Of 40 couples contacted, 32 agreed to participate. 
Thus, 20 per cent refused to volunteer.
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Groups II and III each included 32 male-female dyads 
selected from seven different sections of an introductory 
psychology course at The University of Oklahoma. The sub­
jects previously indicated their willingness to participate 
in a psychological experiment to earn points to be applied 
to their final grade. Each subject was scheduled for an 
hour experiment to be conducted in a conference room of the 
university library. The criterion for inclusion into these 
groups was operationally defined by ratings on a scale de­
veloped to reflect degree of familiarity. During a regular 
class period each student was provided with a list of names 
of students of the opposite sex in that class. The student 
indicated on a 5-point scale adjacent^to each name the extent 
to which he was familiar with every student of the opposite 
sex. The 5-point familiarity scale contained the following 
anchor points: 1 , very familiar; 2 , quite familiar; 3 , moder­
ately familiar; 4, quite unfamiliar; 5, very unfamiliar. _
This procedure generated a list of ratings by each student 
for all other opposite-sex students. The requirements of 
the experimental design with regard to familiarity were ful­
filled on the basis of rater-versus-ratee comparisons. An 
inter-rater agreement of either two or three was used in 
matching dyads for Group 11 (casual acquaintances), and an 
inter-rater agreement of four or five was used in pairing 
dyads for Group 111 (strangers). For example, if male^
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rated female^ with a "2" and female^ rated male^ with a "3'*s 
they were matched and assigned to Group II. The above pro­
cedure was repeated until the requirement of 32 dyads per 
group was attained. One female subject failed to report for 
the experiment, so that the dyad was deleted and replaced by 
another.
Means descriptive of significant Group 1 attributes 
included the following: age=24.9 (males=25•8,females=24.0); 
and years married=3.9* The mean age for Group 11 was l8.6 
(males=l8.6, females=l8.6) and for Group 111 was l8.3 (males= 
l8.8, females=17•8 ).
Judging Instruments 
Personality trait predictions. A list of 58 de­
scriptive adjectives randomly culled from the 100 word list 
developed by Crandall and Bellugi (195^) were used to assess 
the accuracy of personality judgments (see Appendix A). Each 
of the adjectives was typed on a 3X 5 index card, forming a 
deck of 58 cards which was presented to the subject in random 
order. The deck included adjectives such as "alert," "cold," 
"noncommittal," and "tactful." As indicated in the procedure 
section, a subject sorted the deck of adjectives twice, once 
as the adjectives applied to himself and once to predict the 
self-sort of his matched partner.
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Social predictions questionnaire (EPPS). Both be­
cause its content is interpersonally oriented and it has 
been successfully utilized in widespread research, the 
Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS) (1959b) was 
selected as an appropriate technique for obtaining accuracy 
measures for social judgments. Twenty different items 
(i.e., pairs of statements) were systematically drawn from 
the schedule's total number of 225. The rationale employed 
in selecting the EPPS items was essentially their corre­
spondence to overt social behaviors. The number of items 
chosen was necessarily limited due to the extensive time 
(approximately one hour) required to complete the person­
ality trait predictions task. A sample item was:
A. I like to form new friendships.
B. I like my friends to help me when I am in trouble, 
The 20 EPPS items were presented in a mimeographed booklet
in paired-comparison format. Appendix B contains the items 
and the various EPPS scales represented.
Procedure
Half of the dyads in each group were randomly 
assigned to a Q-sort and half to a free-sort instructional 
condition (collectively referred to henceforth as the person­
ality trait predictions task). The design of the experiment 
is shown in Table 1. In a single session for each of eight
32
Table 1 









Q sort Free sort
Married couple 
dyads N=l6 N=l6 <4 ) N=32
Casual
acquaintance
dyads N=l6 (IIq ) N=l6 (Up) N=32
Total stranger 
dyads N=l6 (III,) N=l6 (Illp) N=32
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dyad partners within the same group, subjects completed the 
Q-sort or free-sort task and the social predictions question­
naire twice, in that order.
The experimenter met the eight dyads who appeared 
together in a room large enough to permit each subject to 
work independently of his prearranged partner. The subjects 
in Groups II and III were introduced to their partners by 
the experimenter, who then assured both of the confidential­
ity of the results. After an initial period of trying to 
make the subjects feel comfortable, instructions and materi­
als for the first task were given. When subjects finished 
the first judging task, the experimenter gave them the in­
structions and the material for their second judging task.
Instructions to the Q-sort subjects were given 
orally as follows:
Here is a set of cards which have on them 
adjectives expressing how people think and feel in 
regard to themselves and others. These cards are 
to be sorted into different piles. You will find 
it easier to sort them if you look over a number 
of cards, chosen at random, before you begin to 
sort. Your task is to sort these cards to describe 
yourself as you see yourself today from those that 
are least typical of you to those that are most 
typical of you. You will find seven numbered cards 
spread across the table in order. Card number one 
should be used for adjectives least like yourself, 
and card number seven for adjectives most like 
yourself. The other five cards should be used for 
adjectives that range between the two extremes. 
Directly beneath each of the numbered cards you see 
a corresponding number in brackets. Each of these 
numbers in brackets represents the number of cards 
to be placed in each pile. That is, four cards
34
must be placed in pile 1 , seven cards in pile 2 ,
11 cards in pile 3, and so on. Any questions?
When you have finished, please wait for further 
directions.
Following the completion of the self Q sort, sub­
jects were read the following instructions:
Now that you have finished sorting the adjec­
tives as they describe yourself, I want you to sort 
them again. This time I want you to sort them as 
you think your partner did when he or she sorted 
the adjectives for himself or herself. Again, you 
must place the same number of cards in each pile 
as you did before. That is, four cards must be 
placed in pile 1 , seven cards in pile 2 , 11 cards 
in pile 3, and so on. Any questions? When you 
have finished, please wait for further directions.
The free-sort instructions neither specified the
number of categories to be used up to a maximum of seven nor
the number of adjectives within a category. However, the
subjects were instructed that category 1 represented the
extreme for adjectives "least" like self and that category 7
represented the opposite extreme for adjectives "most" like
self. Free-sort instructions were as follows:
Here is a set of cards which have on them 
adjectives expressing how people think and feel 
in regard to themselves and others. These cards 
are to be sorted into different piles. You will 
find it easier to sort them if you look over a 
number of cards, chosen at random, before you 
begin to sort. Your task is to sort these cards 
to describe yourself as you see yourself today 
from those that are least typical of you to those 
that are most typical of you. You will find 
seven numbered cards spread across the table in 
order. Card number one represents the extreme 
for adjectives least like yourself and card num­
ber seven represents the extreme for adjectives 
most like yourself. The other five cards represent
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the range between the two extremes. You may use 
as few as one or as many as seven piles. Any 
questions? When you have finished, please wait 
for further directions.
Upon completion of the self free sort, subjects 
were read the following instructions:
Now that you have finished sorting the adjec­
tives as they describe yourself, I want you to
sort them again. This time I want you to sort
them as you think your partner did when he or she
sorted the adjectives for himself or herself.
Again, you may use as few as one or as many as 
seven piles, and do not be concerned about the 
number of cards in any pile. Keep in mind that 
pile 1 represents the extreme for adjectives 
least like the other and that pile 7 represents 
the extreme for adjectives most like the other.
Any questions? When you have finished, please 
wait for further directions.
For the Q sort, categories 1 and 7 have four items 
each; categories 2 and 6 have seven items each; categories 
3 and 5 have 11 items each; and category 4 has l4 items.
The distribution of the seven categories was predetermined 
according to the normal curve. For the free sort, subjects 
were allowed to use as many categories as they wished up to 
a maximum of seven. In both sorting conditions, subjects 
recorded their self and predicted sorts on a form provided 
by the experimenter. See Appendix C.
In the_same session, all subjects completed the 
social predictions questionnaire (EPPS) twice. Each subject 
was instructed first to select his own response preference 
for each item and then to predict the response of his matched
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partner on a separate form. The usual EPPS instructions 
were altered to meet the demands of the judging task. The 
instructions were printed on the mimeographed booklet and 
the subject was directed to read these instructions care­
fully, then to begin the task. The instructions were as 
follows :
This questionnaire contains a number of pairs 
of statements about things that you may or may not 
like, about ways in which you may or may not feel. 
Read each pair of statements and draw a circle 
around either the A or B to indicate the statement 
that better describes what you like or how you
feel. Make a choice for every pair of statements;
do not skip any. Any questions? When you have 
finished, please wait for further directions.
After completing the EPPS questionnaire for self­
description, the subjects read the following instructions:
This time I want you to read the statements 
again and circle the letter you believe that your 
partner circled as descriptive of himself or her­
self. Make a choice for every pair of statements;
do not skip any. Any questions? Thank you for 
participating in this research project.
All questions pertaining to the judging tasks were
answered individually. When the questionnaire had been
collected, the experiment was over. Subjects were thanked
and asked not to talk about the study to other potential
participants. No subject evidenced either suspicion or
prior knowledge of the experiment.
In summary, the procedures generated a set of self
personality and social perceptions and a set of predicted
personality and social perceptions for each dyad member.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Product-moment correlations for each dyad member 
were computed as measures of the degree of personality judg­
ment accuracy and of assumed similarity (see Figure l). The 
accuracy correlations were calculated between the partner's 
actual sorting and the subject's predicted sorting and vice 
versa within each dyad. These correlations specified the 
level of accuracy observed within any given dyad. The 
assumed similarity correlations were derived from calcula­
tions between each dyad member's self sort and predicted 
sort, yielding two for each dyad. These correlations indi­
cated the extent to which each dyad member saw himself as 
being like the other dyad member.
A scatterplot of the above scores revealed that 
they were not normally distributed, but negatively skewed. 
Because of the skewness, Fisher's r-to-_z transformation 
(Walker & Lev, 1953) was made prior to performing any 
further statistical analyses. Thus all means, sums of 
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Fig. 1 . Intercorrelations defining various accuracy
and similarity scores.
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simplify interpretation the resulting _z-statistics were 
reconverted to the more familiar product-moment ^'s in all 
of the following tables.
The statistical procedure used for assessing social 
judgment accuracy (EPPS items) was to sum the correct number 
of predictions made by each dyad member, the criterion for 
accuracy being the agreement of the judge's prediction with 
the responses given by the dyad partner and vice versa. 
Measures of social assumed similarity were obtained by total­
ing the number of accurate and inaccurate predictions made by 
each dyad member which were identical to his own self re­
sponses. There were two measures for each dyad. It should 
be noted that raw scores, rather than correlations, were 
derived from the social judgments task since the data were 
dichotomous.
For both hypotheses and both judging tasks, _t tests 
for two independent samples between two group means (Walker 
& Lev, 1953) were computed using .05 as the region of re­
jection. Raw scores are contained in Appendix D for both 
tasks. The data are presented in terms of the two hypothe­
ses advanced earlier.
Hypothesis _1. The first hypothesis predicted a 
positive relationship between familiarity with another 
person and accuracy in predicting that person's behavior.
The first test of this hypothesis was derived from the
ko
personality trait predictions task. The mean accuracy scores 
(i.e., average and standard deviations for the Q- and 
free-sort groups combined are presented in Table 2. As 
mentioned previously, significance of differences was tested 
after applying Fisher's _z transformation to the correlation 
coefficients. The table reveals that this hypothesis was 
only partially supported. Although the difference between 
married couples (average ^=.51) and casual acquaintances 
(average ^=.49) on personality judgment accuracy was in the 
predicted direction, the difference was not significant. In 
contrast, both married couples and casual acquaintances were 
significantly superior to total strangers (average r^=.4o) in 
accurately predicting their respective partner's personality 
traits. All mean accuracy correlation coefficients for the 
personality judgments task were significantly greater than 
zero. These results are in close agreement with those re­
ported by Taft (1966).
An analysis was also made of the Q- and free-sort 
personality accuracy scores separately. The purpose of this 
analysis was to determine whether the accuracy results within 
each of the sorting conditions were consistent with those 
shown in Table 2 for combined Q- and free-sort data. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 3* The jt 
tests reported in the table indicate that married couples 
and casual acquaintances were more accurate than total
4l 
Table 2
Mean Personality Accuracy Scores 
for Q- and Free-sort Groups Combined
Group Mean S.D (one-tailed)
Married Couples (I) 
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Mean Personality Accuracy Scores 
for Q- and Free-sort Groups Separately
Group Mean S.D. t £  (one-tailed)
A. Q sort:
Married Couples (I,) .48 .32
Casual
Acquaintances (IIq ) .46 .19
Total Strangers (IIIq ) .34 .32
Groups compared:
Iq versus IIq .253 NS
Iq  versus Illg 2.196 , <.05
IIq versus Illq 2.282 <.05
B. Free sort:
Married Couples (Ip) .55 .29
Casual
Acquaintances (Up) .52 .21
Total Strangers (IIIp) .45 .21
Groups compared:
Ip versus U p .535 NS
Ip versus IIIp 1.993 <.05
U p  versus IIIp 1.755 < . 0 5
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strangers for both the Q- and free^sort judging tasks con­
sidered separately. However, the mean accuracy scores be­
tween married couples and casual acquaintances within each 
sorting condition were not significantly different from each 
other. These results are in complete agreement with the Q- 
and free-sort data combined.
The second test of Hypothesis 1 resulted from 
social predictions on the EPPS questionnaire. Prior to 
testing differences between group means, the proportion of 
accurate social judgments for each group was compared to 
chance accuracy. No transformations of the proportions were 
needed since Dyke and Patterson (1959) have shown that when 
proportions are approximately 0 .5 , conventional analytical 
methods are applicable. Therefore, it was possible to test 
the significance of the observed proportions by use of the 
one sample proportion test. Since each of the 20 EPPS items 
were dichotomized, the criterion of significance was met 
where the proportions departed significantly from 0.5. This 
theoretical value did not depend on computations from 
observed data.
From Table 4 it is clear that the casual acquaint­
ance and total stranger groups did not judge significantly 
more accurately than chance. However, the married couple 
group made accurate social judgments significantly exceeding 
chance level. Thus, no statistical justification for
44
Table 4
Observed Proportions of Accurate Social Judgments 




Married Couples (I) .606 1.680 -<.05
Casual Acquaintances (II) .554 .857 NS
Total Strangers (III) .548 .762 NS
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comparing casual acquaintances with total strangers exists 
since both groups did not depart from chance accuracy.
Table 5 shows two instances which support Hypothesis 
1 based on data from the social predictions questionnaire. 
Married couples were significantly more accurate in pre­
dicting their partner's social responses than either casual 
acquaintances or total strangers. All group means were 
ordered in the expected direction. In sum, accuracy data 
from both judging tasks lend strong support to the hypothe­
sis under examination.
Hypothesis The second hypothesis which predicted
a higher degree of assumed similarity between married couples 
than between either casual acquaintances or total strangers, 
and a higher degree between casual acquaintances than between 
total strangers, was subjected to two tests. The first of 
these utilized the assumed similarity scores derived from the 
personality trait predictions task. Table 6 summarizes the
relevant results. It is immediately apparent that casual 
%acquaintances assumed more similarity between each other than 
did married couples, a finding opposite to that predicted. 
Likewise, the comparison between married couples and total 
strangers fell far short of statistical significance. As for 
the difference in assumed similarity between the casual 
acquaintance and total stranger groups, the former did assume 
significantly more similarity than the latter. In all, very
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Table 5
Mean Number of Concordant Items on Social Judgment Task
Group Mean S.D. £  (one-tailed)


















Mean Assumed Similarity Scores for 
Combined Q- and Free-sort Data
Group Mean S.D. 2, (one-tailed)
Married Couples (I ) .48 .37
Casual Acquaintances (II) .60 .31
Total Strangers (III) .47 .32
Groups compared:
I versus II -2.710 «Z.005
I versus III .066 NS
II versus III 3.020 «<.005
48
weak support for Hypothesis 2 was obtained from the person­
ality trait predictions data.
An evaluation of the assumed similarity data derived 
from the social predictions questionnaire provided a second 
test of Hypothesis 2. Prior to evaluating the data, however, 
assumed similarity proportims for each group were tested 
against a chance proportion of 0.5. As is shown in Table 7, 
both married couples and casual acquaintances assumed more 
similarity between each other than that expected by chance. 
Legitimate statistical comparisons between married couples 
or casual acquaintances and total strangers were made even 
though the latter group did not significantly exceed chance 
on assumed similarity.
Inspection of Table 8 reveals that married couples 
assumed significantly more similarity to each other than did 
total strangers. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 
2 . In contrast, the mean number of assumed similarities for 
married couples and casual acquaintances was nearly identic­
al, throwing strong suspicion on the hypothesis. The com­
parison between casual acquaintances and total strangers 
showed that the former did assume significantly more simi­
larity to each other than did the latter. This finding is 
in agreement with the second hypothesis.
In brief, only moderate support for Hypothesis 2 
was obtained from both the social and personality judging
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Table 7
Observed Proportions of Assumed Social Similarity 












Mean Number of Assumed Similarities 
on Social Judgment Task
Group Mean S.D. jt £  (one-tailed)
Married Couples (l) 12.28 2.69
Casual Acquaintances (II) 12.29 2.71
Total Strangers (III) 10.85 2.75
Groups compared:
I versus II -.058 NS
I versus III 2.979 <.005
II versus III 2.988 <.005
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tasks. This was evidenced by the fact that of a total of six 
comparisons relevant to the hypothesis, only three were in 
the direction expected.
Comparisons were also made between the Q- and free- 
sort personality accuracy scores for each of the three groups 
separately. These comparisons were undertaken for the 
purpose of providing information on the question of whether 
Q- and free-sort instructional procedures provide comparable 
results regarding personality judgment. Table 9 contains 
the results.
Although the difference between the Q- and free- 
sort mean accuracy scores for both married couples and casual 
acquaintances failed to reach the .05 level of significance, 
there was a consistent trend for both groups in the free-sort 
instructional condition to attain higher accuracy scores than 
comparable Q-sort groups. A comparison of the accuracy means 
for total strangers did yield a significant _t value. Thus, 
it may be concluded that Q-sort (i.e., forced distribution) 
tasks result in a loss of judgment accuracy which may be re­
tained by the use of free-sort procedures of the type 
employed in this study.
Finally, additional tests were made to determine 
the source underlying differences between Q and free sort in 
personality predictive accuracy, in this case either assumed 
similarity or real similarity. Accordingly, partial
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Table 9
Comparisons Between Q- and Free-sort Personality 
Accuracy Scores by Group




























correlations were computed between predictive accuracy and 
assumed or real similarity, holding constant first the 
assumed similarity scores and then the real similarity 
scores. As can be observed in Table 10, there was a con­
sistent trend in the Q-sort condition for the partial corre­
lation between predictive accuracy and assumed similarity 
holding real similarity constant to be higher than the 
partial correlation between predictive accuracy and real 
similarity holding assumed similarity constant. The opposite 
trend was found in the free-sort condition, where the 
predictive accuracy-real similarity partials were con­
sistently higher than the predictive accuracy-assumed simi­
larity partials. Hence, it appears that assumed similarity 
was the predominant source underlying accuracy in the Q-sort 
condition, whereas real similarity resulted in greater accu­
racy in the free-sort condition. However, these statistical 
conclusions should not be construed as implying that either 




Partial Correlations of Predictive Accuracy with 
Assumed Similarity or Real Similarity 
Holding Either Real Similarity or 
Assumed Similarity Constant
Group rl2.3 rl3.2 _z £  (one-tailed)
Married Couples (Iq ) + .695 + .509 1.13 NS
Casual
Acquaintances (IIq ) + .544 + .067 2.06 <.05
Total Strangers (IIIq ) + .540 + .010 2.26 <.05
Married Couples (Ip) -.124 + .647 3.40 ^.002
Casual
Acquaintances (Up) + .132 + .488 1.52 NS
Total Strangers (IIIp) + .474 + .551 .395 NS
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The results of the present study in general give 
support to the first hypothesis under investigation; namely, 
that increasing degree of familiarity with another person is 
positively associated with making accurate social and person­
ality judgments of that person's behavior. Four different 
score comparisons provided support for this conclusion.
First, the personality accuracy means (i.e., average r's) for 
both married couples and casual acquaintances, gleaned from 
Q- and free-sort judging tasks, were significantly superior 
to the personality accuracy mean for total strangers. Second­
ly, the social accuracy mean for married couples, based on 
EPPS item predictions, was significantly greater than it was 
for either casual acquaintances or total strangers. Between 
married couples and casual acquaintances, the mean difference 
personality accuracy score was non-significant, although the 
means were ordered in the expected direction. No comparison 
between casual acquaintances and total strangers on the 
social judgment task was made since neither group departed
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from chance accuracy. Thus, of a total of five statistically 
justifiable comparisons, four were in agreement with theo­
retical expectations.
In relating the results of this study to the work of 
Taft (1966), the experimenter found two striking similari­
ties. First the present data are in complete accordance with 
Taft's finding that personality judgments of acquaintances 
are more accurate than those of strangers. In this study the 
mean personality accuracy scores for casual acquaintances and 
total strangers were .49 and .40, respectively, compared with 
Taft's results of .52 and .42 for similar groups. Since Taft 
required subjects to make predictions of both an acquaintance 
and a stranger, whereas the present experimenter required 
only one prediction from each subject in separate acquaint­
ance and stranger groups, the similarity between the two 
experiments can be considered even more remarkable.
The second similarity was the finding that the 
degree of personality accuracy in total stranger groups of 
both studies significantly exceeded zero or chance accuracy. 
This result has some parallel in Lundy's (I962) conclusion 
that judgment accuracy will increase appreciably above chance 
when the subject focuses his attention upon another person 
rather than himself. In the current study, similar to that 
of Lundy's, total stranger dyads met in a group setting, were 
introduced to one another and then proceeded to complete the
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judging tasks. It seems plausible that during the part of 
the experimental setting when predictions were made, most 
subjects centered their attention on dyad partners although 
this was not demanded of them. Thus, overt observable 
information such as approximate age, sex, race, physical 
characteristics, and expressed behavior of the dyad partners 
was available to each subject. Assuming that subjects were 
aware of and sensitive to these informational factors, it 
can be argued that accuracy involving strangers was a 
function of overtly manifested traits observed during the 
experimental situation. Previous work by Richards et al. 
(1962) demonstrated that judges who knew the age, sex, mari­
tal status, and number of children of six complete strangers 
were more accurate in their predictions than judges who knew 
only the nationality and sex of the strangers. Many other 
examples could be cited of stimulus information leading to 
predictive accuracy.
Casual acquaintances undoubtedly used additional 
behavioral information obtained through greater familiarity 
with their respective dyad partners. Barring the unlikely 
possibility that the subjects were familiar with how their 
partners rate themselves on social and personality tasks, 
additional information resulted in more valid observations 
than was available to total strangers, who relied primarily 
on superficial trait characteristics. On the basis of such
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additional cues, accurate behavioral judgments can be made 
despite the constant possibility of a biasing effect arising 
from the affective component associated with casual 
familiarity.
The accuracy results also warrant the conclusion 
that, on the whole, married couples were able to use their 
longer period of familiarity in a valid manner. Consequently, 
it may be inferred that the advantage of the extra infor­
mation obtained through marriage was not outweighed by any 
bias that might have arisen from the emotional aspects of 
the dyadic relationship. However, this conclusion must be 
tempered in light of the fact that married couples did not 
attain significantly higher personality accuracy scores than 
did casual acquaintances. It seems reasonable to suggest 
that the nature of the personality judgment task limited the 
degree of accuracy possible. Consider the sequence of events 
involved in arriving at personality predictions. Subjects 
sorted 58 different adjective traits into a series of cate­
gories , the exact number of categories and adjectives in each 
depending on the condition to which they were assigned. Each 
adjective was broad and descriptive with no specific refer­
ence to a particular behavioral domain, such as attitudes 
toward sex or group leadership. For example, "wild" may be 
perceived and judged for one's self and for an other as 
either a desirable or an undesirable personality trait,
59
depending on the distinctive social context in which it is 
applied. In relationship to the current study, it seems 
quite doubtful that familiarity would add to the accuracy of 
married couples' personality judgments if no behavioral 
context is provided. In contrast, supposing that a specific 
behavior is signified, a subject should be able to catego­
rize accurately his spouse's self—perception along a con­
tinuum from "most like self" to "least like self." This 
explanatory approach is consistent with the finding that 
married couples did, in fact, predict significantly more 
accurately than casual acquaintances on the social judgment 
task where forced-choice social behaviors were supplied.
In summary, while few investigators have directly 
examined the relationship between familiarity and predictive 
accuracy, there is a growing consensus among investigators 
that familiarity coupled with valid behavioral observations 
can serve to increase the veridicality of various types of 
judgments (Ferguson, 1949; Newcomb, 1958; Richards et al., 
1962; Taft, 1966). One task for future researchers will be 
to specify the relative contribution of which specific cogni­
tive, emotional, or other factors associated with familiarity 
seem to produce facilitative effects on predictive accuracy. 
It would also be of interest to study other clearly defined 
criterion groups of familiarity, such as "steadies," 
"fiances," and "newlyweds," in order both to extend the
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present results and to give more generality to the hypothe­
sis. Finally, an equally important task for future research 
should be the question of whether ability to perceive others 
accurately generalizes over various levels of familiarity.
For if such ability does not hold over different persons and 
task characteristics to be judged, then, of course, the search 
for personality determinants of a hypothetical generalized 
ability must be abandoned. Because each subject in the 
present study judged only one other subject, no evidence was 
obtained concerning the problem of whether ability to perceive 
others accurately generalizes over levels of familiarity.
The overall results pertaining to the second hy­
pothesis were both equivocal and surprising. It will be re­
called that Hypothesis 2 predicted an increase in assumed 
similarity as a function of increase in familiarity. The 
findings on the personality judgment task were partially in­
consistent with the hypothesis. The difference between 
casual acquaintances and total strangers was in agreement 
with the original prediction, since the former assumed more 
similarity to each other than did the latter. On the other 
hand, casual acquaintances did assume significantly more 
similarity to each other than did married couples. Moreover, 
the difference was non-significant between married couples 
and total strangers. Both of these results are in oppo­
sition to the hypothesis.
6i
In a similar vein, although the findings were less 
equivocal, assumed similarity data on the social judgment 
task did not entirely support the original predictions. In 
accordance with the hypothesis, married couples and casual 
acquaintances both assumed significantly more similarity to 
each other than did total strangers. Contrariwise, the mean 
comparison between married couples and casual acquaintances 
was not significant. In all, of a total of six relevant 
comparisons, two were non-significant, one was in the oppo­
site direction to that predicted, and three supported the 
assumed similarity hypothesis. It may be concluded that the 
unrestricted hypothesis of familiarity leading to assumed 
similarity is untenable.
Since the bulk of previous research has shown that 
assumed similarity does increase as a function of the af­
fective interpersonal role relations between dyad partners 
(Bieri, 1953; Chowdhry & Newcomb, 1952; Newcomb, 1958; Taft, 
1966), there was a sound basis for the theoretical predic­
tions. Taft, for example, found assumed similarity to be 
appreciably higher between casual acquaintances than between 
total strangers. Newcomb (1958) has gone so far as to sug­
gest that similarity assumed between dyad members is the 
definitive quality of the interpersonal prediction process. 
Working with college males who were brought together as 
strangers who shared common quarters for several months, he
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pointed to assumed similarity as the most significant factor 
in interpersonal attraction. Furthermore, Newcomb argues 
that "accurate communication tends to result in increased 
attitudinal similarity" (1958, p. I83)•
All of the authors cited above have offered the 
same theoretical explanation as to why attraction, and in 
this study's context considered concomitant with familiarity, 
is positively associated with assumed similarity: In brief, 
they consider that subjects tend to assume more similarity in 
judging persons to whom they are attracted than to those for 
whom attraction has not been established. In support of this 
formulation, Corsini (1956b) found that happiness in marriage 
is positively associated with similarity of the self-per­
ceptions of mates, while Kipnis (196I) found that individuals 
perceive their friends to be more simile to themselves than 
others they like less well. In terms of the present research, 
if it can be assumed that married couples are more attractive 
to their spouses than male-female dyads who are casually 
acquainted, then why did the social and personality assumed 
similarity scores for the former not attain a significantly 
higher value? This question is clearly a fruitful subject 
for further study. In any case, perhaps the most relevant 
contribution from the present data is that interpersonal 
attraction and its subsidiary factors (e.g., affect and in­
creased social interaction) as they relate to assumed
63
similarity is a considerably more complex relationship than 
previous researchers have iniplied.
Results regarding the consistent, although moderate, 
discrepancy between Q- and free-sort personality accuracy 
scores for each level of familiarity considered separately 
warrants discussion. It will be recalled that Taft (1966) 
employed only a Q-sort technique for obtaining indices of 
personality accuracy between casual acquaintances and total 
strangers. The present experiment was stimulated, in part, 
by the question of whether accuracy measures derived from Q- 
and free-sort procedures would be in fundamental agreement 
with each other. Mean comparisons within each familiarity 
level involving these two judging tasks suggest that the 
free-sort procedure does enable the subject to attain moder­
ately higher accuracy scores, regardless of the level of 
familiarity considered (see Table 9, p « 52).
A possible explanation for the moderate superiority 
of free-sort over Q-sort accuracy measures is that the latter 
both limits the spontaneity of the judging task and places 
rather rigid restrictions on the subjects' judging behavior. 
Some support for this explanation is found in a comparison of 
the partial correlation coefficients (see Table 10, p. 5^):
1. Partial correlations between assumed similarity and pre­
dictive accuracy with real similarity partialed out were high­
er in the Q sort; 2. partial correlations between real
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similarity and predictive accuracy with assumed similarity 
partialed out were higher in the free sort. It seems reason­
able to believe that the relatively unrestricted free-sort 
condition permitted dyad partners, independently of one 
another, to express their real similarity to a greater extent 
than did the Q-sort condition. The lack of restrictions in­
cluded the unspecified number of cards to be placed in each 
category as well as the relative choice to use as few as one 
or as many as seven categories. As such, there appears to be 
considerably more opportunity to attain higher accuracy scores 
in the free-sort condition, which, in fact, occurred.
In contrast, it would follow that subjects in the 
Q-sort condition considered the requirement of an exact num­
ber of cards in each category as forcing them to concentrate 
on counting cards, which in turn distracted them somewhat 
from the main task (i.e., predicting their partner's self­
sorts). Consequently, a Q-sort procedure may be a distortion 
of the very process under investigation, namely, the ability 
to accurately predict another person's behavior. Of course, 
additional research will be needed to resolve the noted dis­
crepancy found between Q- and free-sort accuracy measures.
Methodologically, these findings have important im­
plications for any researcher who may use Q- or free-sort 
techniques indiscriminately. In addition, extreme caution 




Clearly, the ability to correctly predict another 
person's behavior is a fundamental characteristic of all 
social relationships. In recent years there has been an 
intensifying interest in delineating the various aspects of 
the process of how one comes to know and to understand other 
persons, their qualities, characteristics, and inner states. 
Consistent with this, research in the area of interpersonal 
perception has concerned not only studies of accuracy of per­
ception (e.g., Bronfenbrenner et al., 1958), but also com­
ponents of accuracy (e.g., Cronbach, 1955) and generality of 
accurate social perception (e.g., Cline & Richards, I96O; 
Crow, i960). Although these studies indicate an increasing 
concern with cognitive processes, as yet there have been only 
meager attempts to analyze a judge's ability to predict 
another person's behavior accurately, depending on the extent 
of familiarity involved (Ferguson, 19^9; Knight, 1923; New­
comb, 1958; Shen, 1923; Taft, I966).
The present experiment investigated the relationship
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between degree of familiarity with another person and ability 
to make accurate social and personality judgments of that 
person's behavior. Two hypotheses were tested:
1. Predictive accuracy is positively associated 
with degree of familiarity between male-female dyads.
2. Assumed similarity varies directly as a function 
of the degree of familiarity between male-female dyads.
Finally, another purpose was to examine the accuracy 
of personality judgments using two related techniques, Q 
sort and free sort, in order to determine the extent to which 
generality between them exists.
The experimental design required the selection of 
male-female dyads who were either intimately acquainted, 
casually acquainted, or nonacquainted with each other. 
Accordingly, three groups of 32 dyads each were formed on 
the basis of two separate sample selection methods. Group I 
(intimate acquaintances) consisted of volunteer married 
couples drawn from a University of Oklahoma housing complex. 
Groups II (casual acquaintances) and III (total strangers) 
were undergraduate students recruited from seven sections of 
an introductory psychology course at The University of Okla­
homa. A 5-point rating scale designed to reflect degree of 
familiarity between male-female dyads in each class was used 
to assign subjects to the latter two groups.
In a single session for each of eight dyads within
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one of the groups, subjects completed either a Q- or free- 
sort personality trait predictions task and a social pre­
dictions questionnaire, in that order. For the Q- or free- 
sort task, subjects were instructed to sort a deck of $8 
descriptive adjectives twice, once for self-description and 
once for predicting their partner's self-sort. For the 
social judgments task, consisting of 20 Edwards Personal 
Preference Schedule items, each subject was instructed first 
to select his own response preference for each item and then 
to predict the response of his matched partner.
Scores from these judging tasks were selected to 
measure the variables under investigation in the following 
manner: for personality judgment accuracy, correlations be­
tween partner's actual sort and subject's predicted sort; 
for social judgment accuracy, the number of correct pre­
dictions made by each subject on his matched partner; for 
personality assumed similarity, correlations between each 
subject's self-sort and predicted sort; for social assumed 
similarity, the number of each subject's predictions which 
coincided with self descriptions. There were two measures 
within each dyad for the four variables.
The mean accuracy scores for each of the three 
groups on both judging tasks indicated general support for 
the first hypothesis. The explanation was offered that 
familiarity has a facilitative effect on predictive accuracy
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by allowing for valid behavioral observations and infor­
mation. A number of suggestions for additional research 
were proposed, including investigation of other types of 
familiarity relationships and the question of generality 
over various levels of familiarity.
Results concerning the second hypothesis were 
equivocal since three statistical comparisons supported 
original predictions, while two disconfirmed the pre­
dictions and one was non-significant. It was concluded that 
the association between assumed similarity and degree of 
familiarity (presumably reflecting interpersonal attraction) 
may be more complex than former investigators have thought.
Differences between Q- and free-sort personality 
accuracy scores, favoring the latter condition, were noted; 
free-sort procedures may allow subjects to attain higher 
accuracy because of the absence of restrictions on their 
judging behavior.
In all, the current experiment disclosed many new 
avenues for research dealing with the familiarity variable 
and for methodological questions pertaining to Q- and free- 
sort techniques.
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EPPS Variables, Number of Times Represented 
and Selected Items Employed in 
Social Predictions Questionnaire
EPPS variable Number of 
times 
represented
EPPS variable Number of 
times 
represented
Abasement 1 Dominance 5
Affiliation 3 Exhibition 4
Aggression 4 Heterosexuality 5
Aut onomy 1 Nurturance 6
Deference 5 Succorance 6
1. A. When planning something, I like to get suggestions
from other people whose opinions I respect, (def)
B. I like my friends to treat me kindly, (sue)
2. A. I like to be the center of attention in a group. (exh)
B. I like my friends to make a fuss over me when I am
hurt or sick, (sue)
3. A= I like to criticize people who are in a position of
authority, (aut)
B. I feel timid in the presence of other people I regard 
as my superiors, (aba)
4. A. I like to praise someone I admire, (def)
B. I like to be regarded as physically attractive by
those of the opposite sex. (het)
5 . A. I like to talk about my achievements, (exh)
B. I like to listen to or to tell jokes in which sex: 
plays a major part, (het)
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6. A. When I am in a group, I like to accept the leadership
of someone else in deciding what the group is going 
to do. (def)
B, I feel like criticizing someone publicly if he 
deserves it. (agg)
7 . A. I like to ask questions which I know no one will be
able to answer, (exh)
B. I like to tell other people what I think of them, (agg)
8. A. I like my friends to be sympathetic and understanding
when I have problems, (sue)
B. I like to accept the leadership of people I admire, 
(def)
9. A. I like to have strong attachments with my friends.
( af f )
B. I like to say things that are regarded as witty and
clever by other people, (exh)
10. A. I like to be called upon to settle arguments and
disputes between others, (dom)
B. I like my friends to do many small favors for me 
cheerfully, (sue)
11. A. I like to do things with my friends rather than by
myself, (aff)
B. I like to argue for my point of view when it is 
attacked by others, (dom)
12. A. I like my friends to help me when I am in trouble.
( sue )
B. I like to treat other people with kindness and 
sympathy, (nur)
13• A. I like to be one of the leaders in the organizations 
and groups to which I belong, (dom)
B. I like to sympathize with my friends when they are 
hurt or sick, (nur)
l4. A. I like to be loyal to my friends, (aff)
B. I like to go out with attractive persons of the
opposite sex. (het)
15• A. When with a group of people, I like to make the 
decisions about what we are going to do. (dom)
B. I like to engage in social activities with persons
of the opposite sex. (het)
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16 . A. I like to do small favors for my friends, (nur)
B. When planning something, I like to get suggestions 
from other people whose opinions I respect, (def)
17. A. I like to forgive my friends who may sometimes hurt
me. (nur)
B. I like my friends to encourage me when I meet with 
failure, (sue)
18. A. I like to show a great deal of affection toward my
friends, (nur)
B. I like to be regarded by others as a leader, (dom)
19. A. I like to attack points of view that are contrary
to mine, (agg)
B. I like my friends to confide in me and to tell me 
their troubles, (nur)
20. A. I feel like making fun of people who do things
that I regard as stupid, (agg)
B. I like to listen to or to tell jokes in which sex


















Personality Judgment Accuracy - and ^  Scores
for Married Couples
Group I - Q sort Gr oup I - Free sort
Dyad Male F emale Dyad Male Female
No . N o .
z z z z 22— r — r
1 .189 .187 .332 .320 1 .582 .524 .460 .430
2 .448 .420 .506 .467 2 .4l6 .394 .805 .667
3 .623 .553 .922 .727 3 .444 .417 .275 .268
4 .922 .727 .894 .713 4 . 766 .645 .698 .603
5 .623 .558 .725 .620 5 .609 .543 1.101 .801
6 .6l4 .547 .567 .513 6 .748 .634 .484 .449
7 .725 .620 .693 .600 7 .591 .531 .957 .743
8 .745 .633 .540 .493 8 .628 .557 .719 .616
9 .369 .353 .456 .427 9 .729 .623 .570 .516
10 .424 .400 .456 .427 10 .904 .718 1.156 .820
11 .302 .293 -.007 -.007 11 .644 .567 .775 .650
12 .295 .287 .448 .420 12 .709 .610 .380 .363
13 .558 .507 .506 .467 13 -.497 —. 46o .099 .099
14 .704 .607 .480 .447 14 .831 .681 .430 .406
15 -.523 -.480 .758 .640 15 .470 .438 .680 .592
16 .497 .460 .747 .633 16 .873 .703 .639 .564
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Personality Judgment Accuracy - _ẑ  and jr Scores
for Casual Acquaintances
Group II - Q sort Group II - Free sort
Dyad Male Female Dyad Male Female
No. No.
z z z jr z r̂—jr — r; “X —-jr
1 .673 .587 .549 .500 1 .650 .571 .170 .168
2 .576 .520 .736 .627 2 .370 .354 .718 .615
3 .175 .173 .385 .367 3 .688 .597 .234 .230
4 .532 .487 .489 .453 4 .687 .596 .924 .728
5 .339 .327 .456 .427 5 .636 .562 .781 .653
6 .623 .553 .182 .180 6 .450 .422 .592 .531
7 .595 .533 .936 .733 7 .786 .656 .573 .518
8 .148 .147 .472 .440 8 .277 .270 .412 .390
9 .643 .567 .540 .493 9 .739 .629 .446 .419
10 .400 . 380 .456 .427 10 .275 .269 .761 .642
11 .238 .233 .736 .627 11 .423 .340 .592 .532
12 .332 .320 .567 .513 12 .835 .683 .884 .709
13 .576 .520 .416 .393 13 .558 .506 .377 .360
14 .385 .367 .295 .287 l4 .968 .748 .561 .508
15 .817 .673 .817 .673 15 .248 .243 .535 .489
l6 .662 .580 .309 .300 16 .628 .556 .814 .672
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Personality Judgment Accuracy - _ẑ  ana ^  Scores
for Total Strangers
Group III - Q sort
Dyad Male F emale Dyad Male F emale
No . No.
z z z z r_—T — r
1 .416 .393 .288 .280 1 .297 .289 .379 .362
2 .332 .320 -.614 -.547 2 .788 .657 .446 .418
3 .324 .313 .259 .253 3 .688 .597 .571 .516
4 .317 .307 .324 .313 4 .380 .363 .533 .489
5 .805 .667 .464 .433 5 .382 .364 .593 .532
6 .347 .333 .309 .300 6 .734 .626 .234 .230
7 .l4l .l40 .168 .167 7 .410 .389 .690 .598
8 .013 .013 .693 .600 8 .674 .587 .565 .512
9 .614 .547 .060 .060 9 .091 .091 .369 .353
10 .381 .363 .595 .533 10 .677 .589 .618 .550
11 .604 .540 -.155 -.153 11 .293 .285 .138 .138
12 -.385 -.367 .549 .500 12 .871 .702 .247 .242
13 .489 .453 .472 .440 13 .630 .558 .394 .375
14 .908 .720 .217 .213 l4 .609 .543 .560 .508
15 .704 .607 .633 .560 15 .736 .627 -.017 -.017
16 .576 .520 .400 .380 16 .401 .380 .656 .576
Group III - Free sort
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Personality Assumed Similarity - and r̂ Scores
for Married Couples
Group I - Q sort Group I - Free sort
Dyad
No.
Male Female Dyad 
1 No.
Male Female
% —  1 ^r —_r r
1 .643 .567 .385 .367: 1 .006 .006 .035 .035
2 .259 .253 .981 .753 2 .123 .122 .104 .103
3 .894 .713 .965 .747 3 .637 .563 .946 .738
k .704 .607 .643 .567 4 L.239 .845 .842 . .687
5 .725 .620 .805 .667 5 .601 .538 .701 .605
6 .489 .453 .633 .560 6 -.013 -.013 .452 .424
7 .480 .447 .854 .693 7 .510 .470 .664 .581
8 .523 .480 .880 .707 8 .274 .267 .575 .519
9 .259 .253 .514 .473 .404 .383 .215 .212
10 .280 .273 .842 .687 10 .199 .196 .271 .265
11 .161 .160 .354 .340 11 .227 .223 .258 .252
12 .604 .540 .894 .713 12 .255 .250 1.449 .895
13 .252 .247 .643 .567 13 .413 .391 -  a 629 -.558
14 .408 .387 .489 .453 14 .642 . 566 .669 .584
15 -.595 -.533 .714 .613 15 .049 .781 .442 .416
16 .714 .613 .894 .713 16 .978 .752 .891 .712
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Personality Assumed Similarity - _z and ^ Scores
for Casual Acquaintances
Group II - Q sort
Dyad Male F emale Dyad Male Female
No. No.
z r̂ z z z r̂—T — r — r —r
1 .424 .400 .392 .373 1 .201 .199 .343 .330
2 1.268 .853 1.137 .813 2 .913 .723 .873 .703
3 .558 .507 .480 .447 3 .042 .042 .366 .350
4 .448 .420 .385 .367 4 .752 .636 .921 .726
5 .817 .673 .339 .327 5 .861 .697 1.261 .851
6 .182 .180 .714 .613 6 .699 .6o4 .877 .705
7 .867 .700 1.293 .860 7 L.2O 3 .835 .856 .694
8 .736 .627 .693 .600 8 .611 .545 .713 .613
9 .614 .547 .908 .720 9 .534 .488 .765 .644
10 • 950 .740 .497 .460 10 -.035 -.035 .355 .341
11 .725 .620 .456 .427 11 .768 .646 .511 .471
12 1.045 .780 .514 .473 12 1.256 .850 1.036 .776
13 .704 .607 .880 .707 13 .371 .355 .583 .525
14 .302 .293 .683 .593 i4 .796 .662 .775 .650
15 L.319 .867 .758 .640 15 .616 .548 .389 .371
16 .400 .380 1.080 .793 16 1.134 .812 .297 .289
Group II - Free sort
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Personality Assumed Similarity - _ẑ  and ^  Scores
for Total Strangers
Group III - Q sort Group III - Free sort
Dyad Male Female Dyad Male Female
N o . N o .
z z z z r̂—T — r —;r
1 .189 .187 .408 .387 1 .227 .223 .579 .522
2 1.099 .800 -.295 -.287 2 .978 .752 .476 .443
3 .354 .340 .400 . 380 3 .676 .589 .359 .344
k .332 .320 .781 .653 4 .530 .485 .793 .660
3 .416 .393 .867 .700 5 .554 .504 1.045 .780
6 .324 .313 .633 .560 6 .916 .724 .420 .397
7 .317 .307 .060 .060 7 .785 .656 .975 .751
8 1.029 .773 .175 .173 8 .525 .482 .872 .702
9 -.087 -.087 .280 .273 9 .580 .523 .497 .459
10 .683 .593 .381 .363 10 .975 .751 .493 .456
11 -.027 -.027 .936 .733 11 .011 .011 .632 .560
12 .456 .427 -.424 —. 4oo 12 .680 .592 .461 .431
13 .725 .620 .332 .320 13 .507 .468 .819 .674
l4 .317. .307 .867 .700 14 .652 .573 .669 .585
15 .908 .720 .662 .580 15 .193 .190 .843 .688
l6 .558 .507 .107 .107 16 .254 .249 .721 .618
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Social Judgment Accuracy - Raw Scores
for Married Couples






1 12 11 1 17 10
2 15 13 2 l4 11
3 12 13 3 11 5
4 14 16 4 10 11
5 13 l4 5 8 13
6 9 15 6 11 15
7 15 13 7 16 14
8 14 10 8 9 12
9 15 8 9 13 l4
10 11 5 10 13 11
11 15 12 11 17 14
12 8 15 12 l4 11
13 18 7 13 9 13
l4 9 15 l4 8 13
15 10 12 15 8 12
l6 l4 13 16 11 12
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Social Judgment Accuracy - Raw Scores
for Casual Acquaintances
Group II - Q sort Group II - Free sort
Dyad Male Female ’ Dyad Male Female
No. r No.
1 15 13 1 8 13
2 10 14 2 15 9
3 13 12 3 8 11
k 14 9 4 11 11
3 12 10 5 11 11
6 l4 16 6 6 10
7 17 13 7 12 12
8 9 10 8 7 13
9 13 9 9 11 12
10 12 9 10 8 10
11 8 12 11 9 14
12 10 13 12 9 9
13 12 10 13 12 13
l4 9 12 l4 l4 11
15 13 7 15 13 5
l6 15 9 16 11 6
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Social Judgment Accuracy - Raw Scores
for Total Strangers
Group III - Q sort Group III - Fre e sort
Dyad
No.
Male Female Dyad 
No .
Male Female
1 14 6 1 11 5
2 10 12 2 5 12
3 13 6 3 12 10
4 16 18 4 13 11
5 10 9 5 9 9
6 12 l4 6 11 9
7 7 13 7 12 10
8 7 13 8 12 13
9 13 10 9 13 9
10 12 8 10 13 13
11 5 12 11 10 15
12 10 7 12 10 9
13 l6 11 13 12 11
Ik l4 14 14 12 11
15 13 10 15 10 8




Social Assumed Similarity - Raw Scores
for Married Couples
Group I - Q sort Group I - Free sort
Dyad
No.
Male Female Dyad 
N o .
Male Female
1 13 10 1 12 13
2 10 14 2 7 9
3 l6 13 3 13 13
4 13 13 4 16 11
5 13 16 5 8 13
6 12 15 6 14 l6
7 8
V
13 7 16 l4
8 14 10 8 13 12
9 17 8 9 14 l4
10 10 14 10 13 11
11 17 l4 11 11 10
12 10 17 12 7 10
13 12 11 13 9 11
Ik 10 12 l4 7 8
15 17 9 15 l4 10
l6 15 12 l6 13 16
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Social Assumed Similarity - Raw Scores
for Casual Acquaintances






1 11 7 1 10 10
2 17 13 2 14 15
3 10 15 3 11 12
k 14 11 4 14 8
5 13 7 5 15 17
6 8 12 6 13 11
7 l4 l4 7 l6 10
8 19 10 8 8 15
9 12 l4 9 18 9
10 10 11 10 11 11
11 ip 14 11 12 11
12 13 12 12 15 15
13 l4 13 13 8 9
14 13 12 l4 12 9
15 16 12 15 12 12
l6 9 17 16 14 11
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Social Assumed Similarity - Raw Scores 
for Total Strangers






1 9 12 1 14 12
2 15 13 2 13 10
3 13 4 3 7 14
4 11 7 4 11 11
5 12 11 5 7 11
6 12 6 6 14 8
7 14 16 7 9 12
8 7 11 8 l4 11
9 10 9 9 9 5
10 12 12 10 13 11
11 9 11 11 10 9
12 l4 11 12 11 4
13 8 11 13 12 13
14 12 8 l4 7 12
15 9 l6 15 l4 14
16 l4 10 l6 10 l4
